Journal
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Volume 141, Issue 1, Pages 7-19Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y
Keywords
truthmaker; commitment; grounding; fundamental
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On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking-via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding-can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
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