Journal
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 64, Issue 2, Pages 457-469Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.001
Keywords
Noncooperative games; Nonatomic games; Congestion games; Wardrop equilibrium; Price of anarchy
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We present a short. geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one hand, we give pseudo-approximation results that depend on the class of allowable cost functions. On tire other hand, we derive stronger bounds on the inefficiency of equilibria for situations in which the equilibrium costs are within reasonable limits of the fixed costs. These tighter bounds help to explain empirical observations in vehicular traffic networks. Our analysis holds in the more general context of nonatomic congestion games. which provide the framework in which we describe this work. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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