Journal
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Volume 92, Issue 3, Pages 776-788Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aap042
Keywords
adverse selection; product safety; noisy signals; credence goods; climate forecast
Categories
Funding
- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions under National Science Foundation [SES-0345840]
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We analyze how to induce sellers to disclose food safety With repeated interactions and safety correlated over time, cash transfers alone do not ensure disclosure Perfect. but costly, testing ensures disclosure with a complex lottery that may be difficult to Implement in practice In contrast, even a noisy quality forecast allows the buyer to induce perfect disclosure with a simple pricing scheme Forecast introduction may benefit or harm sellers. After introduction, sellers may suffer from increases in forecast precision As an illustration, we cast our model in the context of Rift Valley fever in an East African livestock market
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