Journal
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Volume 29, Issue 1, Pages 57-66Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.07.011
Keywords
Voting-block statistics; Blockholders; Corporate control
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This paper is a first attempt to analyse the implications of the 2000 corporate tax reform on ownership concentration in Germany. The empirical results document a fall in ownership concentration and a decrease in the power of top institutional owners including the big banks. Hence, the description of German corporate governance as a bank-based system may no longer apply. However, even though the corporate tax reform had a significant effect on ownership concentration and on the power of the top-institutional blockholders, the change in the corporate income tax law did not revolutionise German corporate governance. Ownership concentration in 2005 is still high compared to the Anglo-American economies and an active market for corporate control is not observed. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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