Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Volume 30, Issue 2, Pages 190-202Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2008.07.010
Keywords
Reciprocity; Cooperation; Microeconomic behavior; Experimental economics
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
This paper presents an experimental investigation of strong indirect reciprocity. We examine both generalized indirect reciprocity (if A helps B then B helps C) and social indirect reciprocity (if A helps B then C helps A) in a setting where reciprocal behavior cannot be explained by strategic motivations, using a treatment for direct reciprocity as a benchmark. We use a variant of the strategy method to control for differences in first movers' actions across treatments. We find evidence of strong reciprocity within each treatment, for both strategies and decisions. Generalized indirect reciprocity is found to be significantly stronger than social indirect reciprocity and, interestingly, than direct reciprocity. This finding is interpreted as reflecting the relevance of first movers' motivation for second movers' reciprocal behavior. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available