Journal
ALGORITHMICA
Volume 61, Issue 1, Pages 116-140Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-010-9449-2
Keywords
Price of anarchy; Price of stability; Congestion games; Algorithmic Game Theory; Approximate equilibria; Selfish routing
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We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for congestion games with polynomial latency functions. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor epsilon. We give tight bounds for the price of anarchy of atomic and non-atomic congestion games and for the price of stability of non-atomic congestion games. For the price of stability of atomic congestion games we give non-tight bounds for linear latencies. Our results not only encompass and generalize the existing results of exact equilibria to epsilon-Nash equilibria, but they also provide a unified approach which reveals the common threads of the atomic and non-atomic price of anarchy results. By expanding the spectrum, we also cast the existing results in a new light.
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