Journal
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Volume 54, Issue 2, Pages 354-373Publisher
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0022002709355414
Keywords
signaling games; terrorist spectaculars; value of intelligence; backlash attacks; counterterrorism
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This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for spectacular terrorist attacks is inversely related to the government's toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack.
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