Journal
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
Volume 23, Issue 1, Pages 20-33Publisher
SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
DOI: 10.1177/1059712314557364
Keywords
Enactivism; normativity; Wittgenstein; action; perception; descriptivism
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Funding
- Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion under the research project 'Dispositions, Holism and Agency' [FFI2010-19455]
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In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism.
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