☆ 4.6 Article

Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW (2010)

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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 100, Issue 4, Pages 1826-1846

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AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1826

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Economics

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