Journal
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Volume 126, Issue 3, Pages 1213-1270Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr028
Keywords
D44; L86; M37
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for sponsored-link positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available