Journal
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Volume 119, Issue 4, Pages 766-819Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/661983
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We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the surge began in 2007.
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