Journal
ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS
Volume 43, Issue 2, Pages -Publisher
ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
DOI: 10.1145/1883612.1883617
Keywords
Design; Algorithms; Auctions; resource allocation
Categories
Funding
- HP under NSF [IIS-0329037]
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [JC2008-00337]
- Generalitat de Catalunya [2009-SGR-1434]
- [TIN2006-15662-C02-01]
- [CSD2007-0022]
- [TIN2009-14702-C02-01]
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There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions.
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