Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 283-291Publisher
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00164.x
Keywords
mixed oligopoly; mergers; endogenous timing
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available