Journal
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING SCIENCES
Volume 64, Issue -, Pages 56-65Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2017.12.006
Keywords
Illegal disposal; Enforcement; Inspections; Regional settings; Decentralized management
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Environmental non-compliance is affected by the decentralized shaping of environmental policy by local governments and enforcement actions by public bodies. Illegal waste disposal is examined in a relevant national case, by means of an original regionally disaggregated panel dataset for Italy, a country which witnesses heterogeneous environmental performances across regions and a decentralized policy system. Our empirical analysis produces two main insights of strong policy interest. First, commitment to a more stringent waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal of waste. Second, a nonlinear bell shaped relationship exists between the number of inspections and the quantity of illegal disposal. The key message is that deterrence might only result after a relatively high level of controls is implemented.
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