4.4 Article

Two Mechanisms for Simulating Other Minds: Dissociations Between Mirroring and Self-Projection

Journal

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 197-200

Publisher

SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0963721411409007

Keywords

mentalizing; theory of mind; simulation; self-projection; mirror system

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People often attempt to understand other minds by using their own thoughts and experiences as a proxy for those of others, a process known broadly as simulation. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has identified the neural bases of two forms of simulation: mirroring and self-projection. Mirroring involves a vicarious response in which a perceiver experiences the same current mental state as that of another person, and has been linked recently to brain regions that mirror the experiential states of others. In contrast, self-projection involves imagining oneself in the same situation as another person, predicting one's thoughts and feelings in that hypothetical scenario and assuming that the other would think and feel the same way. This form of simulation has been linked to a set of regions known collectively as the default network and includes the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and posterior cingulate, and lateral parietal cortex. Although most discussions of simulation have conflated these two processes, here we describe the conceptual and empirical reasons to distinguish between self-projection and mirroring and suggest the unique role each plays in understanding others.

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