Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Volume 32, Issue 6, Pages 940-950Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.08.001
Keywords
Ultimatum Game; Dual-system theories; Time pressure; Cognitive load; Experimental economics
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We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. In a dual-system perspective, when proposers are cognitively constrained and thus their deliberative capacity is reduced, their offers are more likely to be influenced by spontaneous affective reactions. We find that under time pressure proposers make higher offers. This increase appears not to be explained by more reliance on an equality heuristic. Analysing the behaviour of the same individual in both roles leads us to favour the strategic over the other-regarding explanation for the observed increase in offers. In contrast, proposers who are under cognitive load do not behave differently from proposers who are not. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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