Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN CYBERNETICS-SYSTEMS
Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 265-276Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.2016.2594808
Keywords
Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); coordination; dual-channel; game theory; marketing effort; two-part tariff contract
Funding
- Iran National Science Foundation
- University of Tehran [300015-1-02]
- Hong Kong Polytechnic University [PolyU 155013/14B]
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This paper explores a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is the CLSC Stackelberg leader. We investigate the effect of exerting marketing effort on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members by considering several marketing effort supported models, namely the models when the manufacturer is the investor, the retailer is the investor, and the centralized CLSC system, respectively. We propose a two-part tariff contract for coordinating the CLSC. We analytically reveal that the two-part tariff contract can coordinate the CLSC when the manufacturer is the investor but unable to coordinate supply chain when the retailer is the investor. Finally, we present the numerical analysis to uncover insights on how the consumers' preference toward the direct channel affects the optimal decisions in the dual-channel CLSC system.
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