Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
Volume 10, Issue 4, Pages 3535-3548Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2018.2830118
Keywords
GPS spoofing; PMU; state estimation; time synchronization attack; weighted least squares
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Funding
- National Science Foundation [ECCS-1462404]
- Smart Grid Security Research Grant from the UTSA OVPR
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Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) endowed with GPS receivers are ubiquitously installed providing real-time grid visibility. A number of PMUs can cooperatively enable state estimation routines. However, GPS spoofing attacks can notably alter the PMU measurements, mislead the network operator, and drastically impact subsequent corrective control actions. Leveraging a novel measurement model that explicitly accounts for the GPS spoofing attacks, this paper formulates an optimization problem to identify the most vulnerable PMUs in the network. A greedy algorithm is developed to solve the aforementioned problem. Furthermore, this paper develops a computationally efficient alternating minimization algorithm for joint state estimation and attack reconstruction. Numerical tests on IEEE benchmark networks validate the developed methods.
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