Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
Volume 10, Issue 2, Pages 2068-2079Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2017.2788040
Keywords
Cyber-physical systems; cybersecurity; false data injection attack; game-theoretic modeling; load redistribution attack; minimax regret
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Funding
- Deanship of Scientific Research, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia [RG-3-135-38]
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This paper develops a multi-level game-theoretic framework for determining a cost-effective defensive strategy for protecting power systems from false data injection attacks like load redistribution attacks. First, a multi-level optimization problem considering interactions among defenders, attackers and operators is modeled based on the minimax-regret decision rule, which is then reformulated as an equivalent bi-level mixed-integer linear programming problem. Next, an implicit enumeration algorithm is developed to find a globally optimal solution to this complex bi-level problem. Several acceleration techniques are introduced to improve the computation efficiency of the proposed method for large-scale power system applications. Last, the proposed defensive strategy is validated by case studies based on a six-bus test system and a modified two-area RTS-96 system.
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