Journal
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 75, Issue 1, Pages 283-298Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.005
Keywords
Dominant strategy mechanism design; Roberts' Theorem; Affine maximizers; Social welfare ordering
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We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We focus on private-value environments. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an m-dimensional open interval, where 111 is the number of alternatives. When the type space of every agent is unrestricted, Roberts' Theorem with neutrality (Roberts, 1979) becomes a corollary to our result. Our proof technique uses a social welfare ordering approach, commonly used in aggregation literature in social choice theory. We also prove the general (affine maximizer) version of Roberts' Theorem for unrestricted type spaces of agents using this approach. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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