Journal
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Volume 32, Issue 2, Pages 256-270Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.02.001
Keywords
Offsetting behavior; Point-record driving license; Seat belts; Traffic law enforcement; Traffic fatalities
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We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable Peltzman effect. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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