Journal
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW
Volume 116, Issue -, Pages 42-58Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2018.05.012
Keywords
Supply chain management; Information acquisition; Dual-channel; Endogenous adverse selection; Contracts
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71772070, 71402126, 71301055, 71671083, 71633002]
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This paper studies an endogenous adverse selection model in a dual-channel supply chain setting, in which the manufacturer can offer a menu of contracts to induce the retailer to costly acquire private demand information. We derive the manufacturer's optimal incentive provision decision and show that although the increase of acquisition cost results in higher distortion effect on the retailer's selling quantity, such a distortion effect can be alleviated in a dual-channel setting. The manufacturer's incentive provision exhibits a threshold policy. When demand variation is high and information acquisition cost is low, acquiring demand information does not necessarily benefit the retailer.
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