Journal
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Volume 40, Issue 2, Pages 353-358Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9
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In a Borda count, bc, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter's penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per (n, n-1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n -1, n-2,..., 0). If partial voting is allowed, and if a first preference is to be given n or n - 1 points regardless of how many preferences the voter casts, he/she will be incentivised to rank only one option/candidate. If everyone acts in this way, the bc metamorphoses into a plurality vote... which de Borda criticized at length. If all the voters submit full ballots, the outcome-social choice or ranking-will be the same under any of the above three counting procedures. In the event of one or more persons submitting a partial vote, however, outcomes may vary considerably. This preliminary paper suggests research should consider partial voting. The author examines the consequences of the various rules so far advocated and then purports that M. de Borda, in using his formula, was perhaps more astute than the science has hitherto recognised.
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