Journal
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS
Volume 43, Issue 3, Pages 229-247Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9215-x
Keywords
Energy efficiency; Energy conservation; Incentive regulation
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We examine the design of regulatory policy to induce electric utilities to deliver the surplus-maximizing level of energy efficiency services, e*. The rebound effect (whereby increased energy efficiency stimulates the demand for energy) typically renders revenue decoupling insufficient in this regard. The additional financial incentive required to induce e* is shown to vary with such factors as the prevailing price of energy, the magnitude of the rebound effect, the extent of observable energy efficiency investments, and the utility's objective.
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