Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 148, Issue 5, Pages 1891-1928Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017
Keywords
Repeated game; Almost-public monitoring; Private monitoring; Belief-free equilibrium; Global game; Robustness
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a regular 2 x 2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available