Journal
ECONOMICS LETTERS
Volume 122, Issue 3, Pages 386-389Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.020
Keywords
Cooperation; Framing; Social dilemmas; Social preferences
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It is standard in experimental economics to use decontextualized designs where payoff structures are presented using neutral language. Here we show that cooperation in such a neutrally framed Prisoner's Dilemma is equivalent to a PD framed as contributing to a cooperative endeavour. Conversely, there is substantially less cooperation in a PD framed as a competition. We conclude that in a decontextualized context, our participants by default project a cooperative frame onto the payoff structure. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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