Journal
ENERGY ECONOMICS
Volume 43, Issue -, Pages 256-263Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.02.012
Keywords
Auctions; Electricity; Market design
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Supply security in imperfect power markets is modelled under different market designs. In a uniform price auction for electricity with two firms, strategic behaviour may leave firms offering too few capacities and unable to supply all realized demand. Market design that relies on capacity markets increases available generation capacities for sufficiently high capacity prices and consequently decreases energy prices. However, equilibrium capacity prices are non-competitive. Capacity markets can increase security of supply, but cannot mitigate market power, which is exercised in the capacity market instead of the energy market. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available