Journal
ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 56, Issue 2, Pages 333-373Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0787-6
Keywords
Best-shot public good; Privately provided public good; Volunteer's dilemma
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We investigate the private provision of a public good whose level is determined by the maximum effort made by a group member. Costs of effort are either commonly known or privately known. For symmetric perfect-information games, any number of players may be active and we characterize the unique (mixed-strategy) equilibrium in which active contributors use the same strategy. Increasing the number of active players leads to stochastically lower individual efforts and level of the public good. When information is private, the symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies. Increasing the number of players yields a pointwise reduction in the equilibrium contribution strategy but an increase in equilibrium payoffs. Comparative statics with respect to costs and levels of risk aversion are derived. Finally, whether information is public or private, equilibria are inefficient-we provide mechanisms that improve efficiency.
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