Journal
MIND & LANGUAGE
Volume 29, Issue 5, Pages 566-589Publisher
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12066
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Philosophers and cognitive scientists have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a logical problem': the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence (e.g. line-of-gaze) for those mental states. The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz. However, Lurz' approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this debate do not agree on criteria for representation. As such, future debate should either abandon the representational idiom or confront underlying semantic disagreements.
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