Journal
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
Volume 36, Issue -, Pages 153-167Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2013.12.006
Keywords
Political connections; Performance; Ultimate control; Privately-controlled enterprises
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This study examines the effects of ultimate control and the political connections of top executives on firm's performance and the monitoring role played by boards of directors. It investigates whether the political influence of ownership and that of management are complements or substitutes in their effects on board independence and accounting performance. The findings indicate that the state holding in SOEs (state-owned enterprises) weakens board independence, but improves accounting performance. The positive effect of a board chair's political connections on firm-level performance is only documented in SOEs. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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