Rebooting discourse ethics

In this article I argue that the conception of discourse ethics that Jurgen Habermas advances in his seminar paper, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification', is subject to significant revision in later work. The central difference has to do with the status of the universalization principle and its relationship to the rightness' validity claim. The earlier view is structured by a desire to provide a weak-transcendental defense of the universalization principle. The later revision, however, essentially undercuts the basis of this argument, because it severs the conception of practical discourse from the analysis of speech acts. As a way of responding to the difficulties this creates, I propose a reboot' of the discourse ethics program. This involves reverting to the earlier, more Durkheimian and less Kantian, formulation of the theory. The result is a program that is no longer encumbered by sterile debates about the correct formulation of the universalization principle, but can plausibly claim to provide insight into the role that language-dependence plays in the development and entrenchment of increasingly pro-social behavior patterns within our institutions.