Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING
Volume 17, Issue 4, Pages 859-870Publisher
IEEE COMPUTER SOC
DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2017.2740931
Keywords
Cognitive radio; pricing; network economics; Stackelberg game; Gilbert-Elliott channel model
Funding
- IITP - Korea government (MSIT) [2015-0-00278]
- NSF [CNS-1421576, CNS-1409336, CNS-1446582]
- Office of Naval Research (ONR) [N00014-15-1-2166]
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Cognitive Radio (CR) networks have received significant attention as a promising approach to improve the spectrum efficiency of current license-based regulatory system. In CR networks, a Secondary User (SU) can use a spectrum vacancy that can be detected by either sensing-before-transmission or database access. However, it is often difficult to detect a vacant spectrum opportunity because of inaccuracies due to sensing and delays to update and/or the database that holds this information. In this paper, we develop a hybrid detection framework in multi-channel CR networks, where an SU can selectively sense a channel for spectrum vacancy by accessing the spectrum history of Markovian channels. We focus on the value of the channel history information offered by the Primary Provider (PP) of each channel, and consider a market for the information exchange between multiple PPs and SUs. We investigate the interplay between of the PPs and the SUs through their pricing and buying decisions for this information, in the presence of sensing inaccuracy, i.e., false alarm and miss detection.
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