Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS
Volume 14, Issue 4, Pages 1491-1500Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TII.2017.2776241
Keywords
Asymmetric information; coalitional game; contract theory; economic incentive; energy trading; renewable energy sources
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation of China [71471128]
- Key Program of National Natural Science foundation of China [71631003]
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Energy informatics is expected to be significant to improve energy trading efficiency. In this framework, the cooperation among small-scale electricity suppliers and the efficient economic incentives to consumers play important roles to maximize the profits of each small-scale electricity supplier and a single aggregator. The aggregator first collects electricity from the suppliers and/or purchases electricity from the main macrogrid, then sells the electricity to the consumers. A coalitional game model in the presence of direct trading among suppliers is presented and a fair revenue division scheme based on the asymptotic Shapley value is derived. Moreover, an optimal contract-based scheme for electricity trading between the aggregator and consumers is proposed. The scheme enables the aggregator to generate more profits when it is for-profit and preferably supports it to serve all consumers when it is non-for-profit.
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