Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
Volume 65, Issue 8, Pages 6425-6435Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2017.2787581
Keywords
Global positioning system (GPS); spoofing detection; time synchronization attack (TSAs)
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Funding
- National Science Foundation [ECCS-1719043, ECCS-1462404]
- Div Of Electrical, Commun & Cyber Sys [1462404] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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This paper introduces the time synchronization attack rejection and mitigation (TSARM) technique for time synchronization attacks over the global positioning system (GPS). The technique estimates the clock bias and drift of the GPS receiver along with the possible attack contrary to previous approaches. Having estimated the time instants of the attack, the clock bias and drift of the receiver are corrected. The proposed technique is computationally efficient and can be easily implemented in real time in a fashion complementary to standard algorithms for position, velocity, and time estimation in off-the-shelf receivers. The performance of this technique is evaluated on a set of collected data from a real GPS receiver. Our method renders excellent time recovery consistent with the application requirements. The numerical results demonstrate that the TSARM technique outperforms competing approaches in the literature.
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