Journal
CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 27, Issue 4, Pages 1009-1032Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10100-018-0530-2
Keywords
Collaboration; Transportation planning; Monotonic path; Cost allocation; Cooperative game theory
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Funding
- Swedish Energy Agency and Sweden's innovation agency (Vinnova)
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In this paper, we focus on how cost allocation can be used as a means to create incentives for collaboration among companies, with the aim of reducing the total transportation cost. The collaboration is assumed to be preceded by a simultaneous invitation of the companies to collaborate. We make use of concepts from cooperative game theory, including the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and the EPM, and develop specific cost allocation mechanisms aiming to achieve large collaborations among many companies. The cost allocation mechanisms are tested on a case study that involves transportation planning activities. Although the case study is from a specific transportation sector, the findings in this paper can be adapted to collaborations in other types of transportation planning activities. Two of the cost allocation mechanisms ensure that any sequence of companies joining the collaboration represents a complete monotonic path, that is, any sequence of collaborating companies is such that the sequences of allocated costs are non-increasing for all companies.
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