Journal
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Volume 77, Issue -, Pages 395-407Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.09.001
Keywords
procurement; corruption; rent-seeking; development
Categories
Funding
- grant RENTSEP [ANR-09-BLAN-0325]
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) [ANR-09-BLAN-0325] Funding Source: Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)
Ask authors/readers for more resources
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two dimensions. First, corrupt public institutions operate by offering contracts without competition and more corrupt entities channel larger share of their budget in this way. Second, these firms enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large-scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4-year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country's GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available