Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 161, Issue -, Pages 161-189Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007
Keywords
Repeated games; Evolutionary game theory
Categories
Funding
- Netherlands' Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) [051-12-012, 051-14-046, 451-04-073]
- Max Planck Society
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In the repeated prisoner's dilemma there is no strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and a profusion of neutrally stable ones. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that in repeated games with large enough continuation probabilities, where the stage game is characterized by a conflict between individual and collective interests, there is always a neutral mutant that can drift into a population that is playing an equilibrium, and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. The existence of stepping stone paths out of any equilibrium determines the dynamics in finite populations playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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