Journal
ECONOMICS LETTERS
Volume 139, Issue -, Pages 5-7Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002
Keywords
Certifiability; Coordination; Information disclosure; Multi-divisional organizations
Categories
Funding
- Agence National de la Recherche (ANR)
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We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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