Journal
MIND & LANGUAGE
Volume 31, Issue 2, Pages 147-176Publisher
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12099
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Funding
- National Science Foundation grant [BCS-0922184]
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Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard (verbal) tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our discussion then draws attention to a number of other inferential hallmarks of early belief-desire reasoning that together suggest it is the real deal.
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