4.5 Article Proceedings Paper

How do contract types and incentives matter to project performance?

Journal

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Volume 34, Issue 6, Pages 1071-1087

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.08.003

Keywords

Capital project; Collaboration; Contract; Incentive; Relational; Teamwork; Trust

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How collaborative contracts and contractual incentives might influence project performance remains equivocal. We hypothesized that their effects on project performance are mediated by owner contractor collaboration, measured in terms of relational attitudes (relational norms and senior management commitment) and teamworking quality (inter-team collaborative processes). Using PLS-SEM, we analyzed a sample of 113 capital projects. The results suggest that through better relational attitudes and teamworking quality, projects with a partnering/alliance contract are likely to perform better than those with lump-sum and reimbursable contracts. Likewise, the projects with incentive contracts are likely to perform better than those without incentives through better relational attitudes and teamworking quality. There were no differences in project performance directly associated with different contract types and contractual incentives. Taken together, a partnering/alliance contract and incentive contracts do not necessarily result directly into better project performance but through relational attitudes and how they play out into actual teamworking behavior. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

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