Journal
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Volume 93, Issue 1, Pages 25-54Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12278
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Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference ofsingular terms. Moreover, perceptionprovides us with knowledge of particulars in our environmentand justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perceptionplay these cognitive andepistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptualexperience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological,psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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