Journal
THOUGHT-A JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 203-211Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.212
Keywords
testimonial injustice; epistemic injustice; Miranda Fricker; mansplaining; credibility deficit; due credibility
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Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearerHwhenHgives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. I show that if it is denied that ultimately these cases exemplify testimonial injustice without credibility deficit, then either they must be taken to exemplify a novel kind of epistemic, non-testimonial injustice, or they bring to light a significant exegetical result.
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