Journal
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Volume 173, Issue 12, Pages 3223-3229Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0659-6
Keywords
Phenomenal particularism; Phenomenal generalism; Phenomenal character; Naive realism; Particularity of experience
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According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111: 311-331, 2014) criticizes this view, and French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2): 451-460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta's criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta's original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta's arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.
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