Journal
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 349-368Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s12351-017-0327-4
Keywords
Risk preferences; Newsboy problem; Production-commitment contract; Asymmetric information
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This article investigates a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer's ordering patterns are highly influenced by his risk preferences. We discuss ordering policies when the manufacturer has limited demand information and propose a production-commitment contract, which mitigates double marginalization under imperfect information. Demand distribution is private information of the retailer and the manufacturer only assumes an educated guess about the mean and variance. Production-commitment contract is an attractive option for make-to-stock scenarios where quantity is confirmed after the demand is realized. We show that lack of information may not have an adverse effect. We also prove analytically that informational advantage may not necessarily be a supply chain advantage and also provide numerical insights for a win-win situation.
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