Journal
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Volume 125, Issue 1, Pages 99-139Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/689773
Keywords
-
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [SES-0720943, 0962492]
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a sequential to a parallel mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection assignment mechanisms, including the sequential, deferred acceptance, and parallel mechanisms in a nested framework. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned the sequential mechanism have moved toward less manipulable and more stable mechanisms. We also show that existing empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available