Journal
PHYSICAL REVIEW E
Volume 95, Issue 2, Pages -Publisher
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.95.022303
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Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61403338, 61304040]
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Many evolutionary game models for network reciprocity are based on an imitation dynamics, yet how semirational imitators prevail has seldom been explained. Here we use a model to investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and partnership adjustment in a polygenic population of semirational imitators and rational payoff maximizers. A rational individual chooses a strategy best responding to its neighbors when updating strategy and switches to a new partner who can bring it the maximal payoff from all candidates when adjusting the partnership. In contrast, a semirational individual imitates its neighbor's strategy directly and adjusts its partnership based upon a simple reputation rule. Individual-based simulations show that cooperation cannot evolve in a population of all best responders even if they can switch their partners to somebody who can reward them best in game playing. However, when imitators exist, a stable community that consists of cooperative imitators emerges. Further, we show that a birth-death selection mechanism can eliminate all best responders, cultivating a social regime of all cooperative imitators. Compared with parallel simulations that assume fixed networks, cooperative imitators are evolutionarily favored, provided they are able to adjust their partners.
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