Journal
ECONOMICS LETTERS
Volume 153, Issue -, Pages 1-5Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.018
Keywords
International environmental agreement; Climate change; Adaptation; R&D; Spillover
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Funding
- SSHRC, Canada [435-2013-0532]
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We consider the formation of an international environmental agreement focusing on adaptation to climate change. Members of the agreement fully share their knowledge and determine their investments in R&D by maximizing their joint welfare, while non-members optimize their individual payoffs. Using a three-stage game formalism, we obtain that a large coalition is achievable and that total emissions increase with the size of the agreement. The welfare implications are parameter dependent. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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