Journal
THEORY AND DECISION
Volume 82, Issue 3, Pages 327-339Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7
Keywords
Ambiguity; Certifiable information; Evidence disclosure; Mechanism design; Maxmin expected utility
Categories
Funding
- Labex MME-DII [ANR11-LBX-0023-01]
- French National Research Agency (ANR AmGames)
- French National Research Agency (ANR AmGames) [ANR-10-LABX93-01]
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This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.
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