Journal
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume 241, Issue 2, Pages 370-380Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.09.006
Keywords
Supply chain management; Incentive contract; Asymmetric information; Supply chain collaboration; Production-planning decision
Funding
- College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio
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This study examines the supply chain demand collaboration between a manufacturer and a retailer. We study how the timing of collaboration facilitates production decision of the manufacturer when the information exchanged in the collaboration is asymmetric. We investigate two collaboration mechanisms: 'Too Little' and 'Too Late', depending on the timing of information sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Our research results indicate that early collaboration as in the 'Too Little' mechanism leads to a stable production schedule, which decreases the need of production adjustment when production cost information becomes available; whereas a late collaboration as in the 'Too late' mechanism enhances the flexibility of production adjustment when demand information warrants it. In addition, the asymmetric demand information confounds production decisions all the time; the manufacturer has to provide proper incentives to ensure truthful information sharing in collaboration. Information asymmetry might also reduce the difference in production decision between the 'Too Little' and 'Too Late' collaboration mechanisms. Numerical analysis is further conducted to demonstrate the performance implications of the collaboration mechanisms on the supply chain. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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