Journal
SOCIAL COGNITION
Volume 35, Issue 2, Pages 127-145Publisher
GUILFORD PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1521/soco.2017.35.2.127
Keywords
goal-directed action; minimal self; agency; infancy; cognitive development; self; ideomotor theory
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The experience of the phenomenal, so-called minimal self is commonly taken as a given and as a core requirement for the performance of goal directed action. We discuss evidence suggesting the exact opposite scenario. In fact, evidence for truly goal-directed movements has been reported no earlier than around 9 months of age, and unequivocal signs of self-other distinction and action-ownership seem to emerge even later. This suggests that the self is not a given but that it emerges through active interaction with one's physical and social environment. Hence, the self is a result, rather than a precondition of intentional action. We discuss evidence that the self-construction process comprises of ideomotor learning, which builds up a database for intentional action selection, and predictive coding, which allows for action evaluation. We also speculate that rudimentary aspects of agency experience may precede the experience of action-ownership.
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