SELF-BY-DOING: THE ROLE OF ACTION FOR SELF-ACQUISITION

The experience of the phenomenal, so-called minimal self is commonly taken as a given and as a core requirement for the performance of goal directed action. We discuss evidence suggesting the exact opposite scenario. In fact, evidence for truly goal-directed movements has been reported no earlier than around 9 months of age, and unequivocal signs of self-other distinction and action-ownership seem to emerge even later. This suggests that the self is not a given but that it emerges through active interaction with one's physical and social environment. Hence, the self is a result, rather than a precondition of intentional action. We discuss evidence that the self-construction process comprises of ideomotor learning, which builds up a database for intentional action selection, and predictive coding, which allows for action evaluation. We also speculate that rudimentary aspects of agency experience may precede the experience of action-ownership.